How we won
















THE TUITION FIGHT





1 - CONTEXT

The education system

When discussing the education system in Quebec, an important and unique characteristic should be taken into account. Between high school and university, there's an institution called the <u>CEGEP</u>, where students can choose to enrol in either two-year program or a three-year technical program. The former leads to university while the latter is oriented toward direct integration into the job market. In the context of Quebec and this text, they are also commonly referred to as colleges.

Important aspects of these CEGEPs include the mixing of students from different programs in core classes such as French, philosophy and sports, as well as the fact that the tuition is free, excluding nominal administration and other fees.

Because of the existence of these institutions, university undergraduate programs are only three years long (as opposed to four years, as found elsewhere in Canada and the USA) and high schools have one less year (eleven, instead of twelve).

Universities in Quebec, like CEGEPs, are all state-funded for the most part, and tuition (contribution by students) is fixed by law: universities can't choose to charge higher or lower tuition, except for the institutional fees (such as registration, administration etc). Furthermore, tuition doesn't vary from one program to another.

While the total cost of enrolment has gone up over the years through institutional fees, the average cost of attending university for a year in Quebec -- around \$2500 -- is still relatively low by international standards. This is partially due to the fact that in 1968, after a general student strike, tuition was frozen at \$500 a year. The tuition remained frozen up until 1990 when it was raised to \$930 and again in 1994 and 2007. Even so, when the government announced in 2011 that it would increase the tuition fees by \$1625, it created a lot of discontent.

The student unions

Though student unions in Quebec have existed in their current form since the mid-sixties, they were only recognised by <u>law</u> in 1983. The law establishes various privileges for student unions such as automatic membership of and levy from all students, seats on various councils such as the administrative board, designated office space and a billboard provided by the campus.

In CEGEPs, only one student union exists per institution. This is important, because 60% of CEGEP students are enrolled in a technical program. Even though most of them don't go on to university, and a hike in university tuition fees is unlikely to affect them directly, as members of the student union they're encouraged to participate in discussions, decision-making and organizing. Each CEGEP student unions typically has a membership of 2000 to 6000 students. In total, CEGEP students make up about 200,000 of the 450,000 students enrolled in post-secondary education in Quebec.

In universities, the structure of student unions is less homogeneous; it varies from one institution to another. There are small departmental unions, unions based on the university programs and large, campus-wide unions. Some unions are structured as federations of smaller unions, others not. Some lump both undergrad and grad students into one union, while in other institutions they'll have separate bodies. As a result of all this, university student unions tend to exhibit more sectarian dynamics, with unions in different parts of the same university that could have entirely different politics and practices, ranging from radical and anti-capitalist to complacent and conservative.

In addition to these local unions, there are also province-wide federations of unions. Three exist today in Quebec: FECQ, FEUQ and ASSE¹.

FECQ and FEUQ are sister organizations, the former grouping CEGEP student unions and the latter, campus-wide university student unions or governments. Both are quite conventional unions, similar to labour federations. Their organizing is top-down, highly centralized and bureaucratic. In terms of politics, they defend leftist values, opposed the tuition fee hike and supported the strike -- in limited fashion. The two student groups are close to the Parti Quebecois, one of the two mainstream political parties in the province. Before the 2012 strike, together they represented over 180,000 students and were considered by politicians and media as the legitimate representatives of students.

ASSE, with its emphasis on direct democracy and direct action, is the more radical union. Before the strike, it had a membership of only 45,000 students. With an understanding that more unions would need to join to build a sufficiently

FECQ:FédérationÉtudianteCollégialeduQuébec(Quebec Federation of College Students)

FEUQ:FédérationÉtudianteUniversitaireduQuébec(Quebec Federation of University Students)

ASSÉ:AssociationpouruneSolidaritéSyndicaleÉtudiante(Association for Solidarity among Student Unions)

large opposition movement, ASSE created a strike coalition, CLASSE by temporarily opening up its structures and conditions to join.



What's an unlimited general student strike?

It's important to understand what is meant by "unlimited general strike". In Quebec, a student strike isn't just a bunch of rallies, marches and occupations. The strike is a complete shutdown of all courses on campus: no classes, no exams and no evaluations are to take place while the strike is on. Once the strike is voted in a general assembly and comes into effect, picket lines are erected and classrooms are emptied. Everyone, students and faculty alike, is forced to respect the strike mandate. Universities and colleges affected by the strike see their academic calendars disrupted, and since no classes or grading is allowed to happen, degrees can't be awarded.

While student unions are recognized by university administrations and by the government, student strikes, however, have no such legal standing. Although not illegal in and of themselves, most of the tactics used by students to enforce their strikes are.

A common argument made for delegitimizing this tactic suggested that students were the only ones losing out by going on strike. Since they already paid for the education, boycotting it made no sense. Would anyone go to Wal-Mart, buy a TV and then just leave it boxed up in the living room as a form of protest?

However, students' strikes are more similar to workers' strikes than they might seem at first glance. Of course, students are penalized by missing their classes, just like workers losing out on their paycheck. But, when the goal is to massively paralyze the education system -- which can be understood as a factory producing wage workers -- then

huge sectors of the economy could be threatened by a workforce shortage.

The fact that business and state officials have said and shown that student strikes shouldn't be tolerated is further proof that they're an effective way of applying pressure.

In short, the *strike* is a complete blockade of classes; it's *unlimited* when the general assemblies vote to maintain this blockade as long as the issue isn't settled; and it's *general* when lots of unions and campuses join the movement.

During the 2012 strike, most student unions held general assemblies every week to decide whether or not stay on strike until the next assembly. While doing so, students meeting each other could also discuss the orientation and the actions of the movement. These regular and populous assemblies were fundamental in creating empowerment and a deep investment into the movement among students.

In large universities with tens of thousands of students, the strike was voted and enforced at the departmental or the school level, never campus-wide. Not only is it virtually impossible to build up enough cohesion to effectively enforce a strike at that level, but holding regular general assemblies with more than about 3000 participants is a logistical nightmare. On the other hand, strikes in smaller institutions, (typically under 7000 students) were voted and enforced campus-wide.

Past student strikes

Any context to the 2012 student strike in Quebec wouldn't be complete without a few words about the history of the student movement in the province.

It wasn't the first time students resorted to an unlimited general strike as a means of protest. This type of collective action by the student movement actually goes back a long way; up to 1968 to be exact. Similar strikes also happened in 1974, 1978, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1996 and 2005. In the majority of cases, students were successful in either blocking counter-reforms or making outright gains in terms of keeping tuition low and winning improvements to student financial aid, a government program of loans and bursaries.

When bringing up the necessity of an unlimited general strike, student unions could draw on a history of struggles in which students not only gave themselves a fighting chance, but actually made real, tangible change.

Comparing 2012 with previous student strikes in the province isn't without its limits, however. Never before had a strike movement involved so many students and campuses

all at once. Already, the 2005 strike had established a record in terms of duration of a student strike (7 weeks), and yet that record was nothing but shattered by students in 2012, with the strike lasting over six months.

Events leading up to strike

By the time the government of Quebec announced the tuition hike in 2012, it was already a well-known policy item of the ruling party. In fact, tuition had already been increasing steadily by about \$100 a year since 2007. When this previous hike came into effect, we tried to launch an unlimited general strike in opposition, but failed: the strike never got started.


In March 2010, the government announced its intention to step up the rate of increase starting in September 2012, but without giving out any specific details. We knew, however, that the hike would be bigger and hit harder than in 2007. Concrete plans were drawn up to block the new hike using

an unlimited general strike.

But the tuition hike was quite an important policy for the government. Along with implementing new user-fees and a special tax in the public healthcare sector² as well as a hike in electricity fees³, the hike was part of a so-called "cultural revolution" in public services pricing pushed by the province's finance minister. These measures were justified by the precarious state of public finances and the need to progressively eliminate the deficit -- a discourse very much in tune with austerity politics being implemented globally.

Though we knew that taking on such a central policy for the government would be difficult, we couldn't imagine student unions standing idle.

- 2 Health-care in Quebec is in large part free and public since the 1960's.
- 3 Electricity is produced and distributed by a single, stateowned corporation. Its prices are regulated by law.



2 - BUILDING THE MOVEMENT

Unions

One of the most crucial aspect of the 2012 Quebec student strike is that it was driven almost exclusively by student unions. This may seem surprising given the fact that today, representative student organisations everywhere seem almost completely co-opted by administrations and political parties. Many shy away from political action altogether and focus heavily on entertainment and cultural activities. By allowing themselves to become breeding grounds for managers and politicians, they have made themselves powerless to challenge education policies at any significant level.

Of course, many student unions in Quebec fit this description. But what's characteristic of the student movement in Quebec is its strong syndicalist wing. Hailing from the very beginnings of student action in the sixties and inspired by early labor movements, it has refused to break from its history of radicalism. At the same time, it has kept

alive a model of collective action : syndicalism.

While syndicalist unions in the student setting might not be a given, they can still make a lot of sense. To be sure, students don't form a homogenous class in the same way workers do. In any given campus, students with a really wealthy background might rub shoulders with others who can barely make ends meets. But despite these different socio-economic backgrounds, students do form a community and they do have a certain set of common interests, independently of their political, philosophical or religious opinions. There is no shortage of issues which can cement support for student unions and which call out for protest.

At the same time, faced with strong adversity and a difficult organising context, many will choose to form or join campus activist clubs. Yet these alone can't hope to give birth to a movement on the scale of the 2012 Quebec student strike. As Jonathan Matthew Smucker writes, "In a society that is self-selecting into ever more specific micro-aggregations, it makes sense that activism itself could become one such little niche. But when it comes to challenging entrenched power, we need more than little niches." ⁴

On the other hand, due to their nature, student unions aren't automatically geared towards empowerment and social change. Through experience, the Quebec student

4 http://www.alternet.org/print/visions/why-we-cant-depend-activists-create-change



movement has found certain useful concepts and practices which can help steer such organisations towards these goals.

Legitimacy

While the perception of legitimacy isn't by itself an effective means to create change, it is important in creating community. How can a student union or a student strike be viewed as legitimate beyond a tiny group of activists? One has to begin by making the distinction between two different levels of legitimacy: internal and external.

Internal legitimacy reflects how legitimate the movement is in the eyes of the participants. This element is crucial because it's a major factor influencing cohesion, resilience in the face of opposition and broadness of the movement.

External legitimacy is the opposite: how legitimate the movement is for non-students or the general public. Of course external legitimacy is also important, but as activists, we have a lot less sway over this factor.

By definition, the movement to block the hike was a countercurrent. The political class, economic elite and media pundits largely supported the tuition hike. At the start of the campaign, none of the mainstream political parties opposed the hike and the propaganda machine had already been hard at work to push the idea that students needed to pay more and more for the privilege of higher education. Students themselves were not immune to its effects, so we knew that it would be difficult to effectively counter the neoliberal myths.

In this context, we knew that only a vast, grassroots effort for participants and are easy to take part. For example: to reach out to students would be powerful enough to have some measure of success. This means direct, non-mediated discussion: in hallways, classrooms, cafeterias and other places where students congregate. Debates and assemblies were organized specifically to discuss the tuition hike, and student unions made their own research and publications that addressed the issue, and distributed them hand-tohand as part of their efforts to reach out.

This also explains why external legitimacy is harder to build up: progressive movements don't have the means to establish the same kind of large-scale, direct discussion with millions of people.

Building leverage

In 2010, as organizing was ramping up, a majority of Quebecois were already favorable to the tuition hike, thanks to generous mass media coverage given to politicians to defend their project as well as sympathetic editorials. The external legitimacy of the movement was relatively low. Media rarely bothered to seriously report on the opinions and ideas of students regarding the hike. Student unions couldn't hope to reverse that trend and force the issue into public debate through lobbyism and representation.

However, by attempting to disrupt business as usual, as social movements have done historically to further progressive causes, students could force the government into negotiations and make their resistance apparent to the public eye. We believed that disrupting economic and government activity was our best chance at building leverage against the political leadership.

Of course, we expected state repression before any negotiations took place, but we were confident in our ability to resist it. If the movement could cope with the attacks of the state, it would surely be victorious. Based on past experiences, we knew that an unlimited general strike had that kind of potential.

For a such strike movement to be successful, it needs very strong internal legitimacy. In that regard, escalation of tactics and direct democracy are two of CLASSE/ASSE's most important principles. Through their application, we could convince more and more people to oppose the tuition hike and become involved in the process of building resistance.

Escalation of tactics

This strategy consists in designing an action plan that proposes a series of actions that are progressively more radical, beginning with actions that aren't very engaging

petitions, political flash mobs or taking a position in a general assembly. We knew these tactics, by themselves, didn't contribute much to stopping the hike. But before organizing more ambitious and effective protests, we needed to build up activist communities in many different CEGEPs and universities. In colleges, where students are generally aged between 17 and 20 years old and turnover is high, political consciousness among the student body is low. Organizing simple actions like petitioning offers an opportunity for such students who are interested in doing something about the tuition hike and who might otherwise be very reluctant to get involved in anything that could lead to confrontation.

A lot of our collective experience as activists in Quebec taught us that building political campaigns through progressive involvement of participants is much more effective in elevating people's political consciousness than mere information or propaganda campaigns. When a petition you've worked on fails to produce any results, when your pacifist sit-in is attacked by police or when a demonstration you were in is ridiculed or mocked in newspapers or on the radio, it tends to highlight the limits and contradictions of the system much better than a flyer might. Of course, it's a process that takes time and which asks of experienced activists who might be veterans of radical movements to take part in some organizing that they would otherwise brush off as being a waste of effort.

Between 2010 and 2012, our commitment to this process lead to a new generation of involved students who in turn, contributed massively to get more of their colleagues involved. In time, our rallies grew larger and larger and local unions were increasingly active and dynamic. On many campuses, we could count on solid cores of activists who eventually reached the conclusion, largely by themselves, that the only way to stop the hike was with an unlimited general student strike.

Direct democracy

Yet, escalation of tactics alone isn't enough. Getting people involved needs to go beyond simply asking people to join actions. Building a rock-solid basis for a movement requires giving real power in the hands of participants and making them part of the decision-making process.

This idea is embodied in CLASSE/ASSE's core principle of direct democracy. A simple, democratic, transparent structure was crucial to the success of our strike.

Firstly, the supreme ruling body in local unions is the general assembly, sometimes also called the general membership meeting. Elected officials such as members of the executive



or administrative boards are under the authority of this assembly, which is open to the union's entire membership.

Everyone is equal during these meetings: staff and board members aren't given any kinds of privileges such as special seating in front of the assembly or right-of-reply. Rules of order, such as "Robert's Rules of Order" are used and strictly applied by a facilitator as a means of structuring the meeting and orienting debates towards collective decision-making. Applying rules of order isn't always easy and sometimes there's a temptation to do away with them altogether. However, in our experience, a formal structure and process which everyone recognises and which can be applied openly and respectfully is much better than informal structure where unclear power relationships between participants can influence the decision-making process to the advantage of an individual or a group. To ensure that knowledge of the rules of order in itself doesn't become a source of inequality among participants, unions publish and make sure the rules of order are available to all, while facilitators take time as needed to explain them and make sure everyone in the meeting understand the processes.

As members of the union, elected officials can bring motions to the floor and participate in discussion; but once the general assembly has passed a motion, their role is to apply that decision: not to discuss it or debate it further. Acting against general assembly resolutions is a grave offense and grounds for impeachment.

At the provincial level, decisions are made by a congress composed of delegates of every local union. Delegates are not representatives of their union's membership, entitled to speak on behalf of the student body, nor are they sent in to express their personal views. Their role is to bring up and defend the positions of their union's own general assembly and abstain from casting a vote if they don't have one on a particular proposal. As a result, only motions which

have the support of a majority of local general assemblies can pass.

As in local unions, the role of elected members of CLASSE/ASSE is to implement the decisions of the congress.

In the two years leading up to the strike, local unions would hold about three or four general assemblies per semester, with CLASSE/ASSE held no more than one or two congresses per semester. When the strike began, however, that rhythm was accelerated with local unions holding at least one general assembly per week and congresses also happening on a weekly basis, during weekends.

Frequent assemblies and congresses meant that decisions made at the provincial would echo as much as possible those made at the grassroots level.

As in local unions, important internal policies and mechanisms are in place to foster a culture of horizontality in which no individual or group holds higher status or symbolic power over others. The idea is to minimize the distance between those who have an official function (staff and elected members) and the rank and file.

Examples of these policies include:

- No special speaking priority in meetings for staff or elected members;
- No special seating (ie. up front) for staff or elected members in general assemblies and congresses and they do not facilitate these meetings;
- No salary or special scholarships for elected members;
- Number of staff is kept to a minimum;
- Stipends are available to whoever is taking on tasks;
- No special/corporate clothing, name-tags or jewelry for staff and elected members and no personalized business cards;
- No luxury furniture in union offices (TVs, leather couches, etc.);
- Non-hierarchical labels for elective functions: no presidents, vice-presidents, directors, chairmen, etc.;
- Undefined member limits for most elected committees, eliminating competition for positions.

When union officials aren't a class apart, when they get the same treatment as everyone else, and when union orientations arise from general assemblies, participation increases as students, having been able to contribute in a meaningful way, are naturally drawn into the process of implementing collective decisions. Additionally, open committees" are key to channeling motivation and enthusiasm towards implementing general assembly resolutions and concrete organizing.

In a few words, a mobilization committee is an informal structure that gathers anyone willing to participate in a political campaign on campus. It often works in concert with the student union, which gives it a budget and some independence allowing it to take political initiatives. The mobilization committee's meetings typically involve the integration of new members, mobilization planning (ie. making flyers, classroom visits, postering, etc.) and dispatching tasks. Those meetings are more informal than general assemblies, but are also guided by the ideas of horizontal organizing. It's customary that elected members of the union make themselves inconspicuous in those meetings, the idea being to share information and involve everyone willing to help on an equal basis.

The combination of direct democracy and escalation of tactics helped us build robust internal legitimacy: democratic

structures with unelected participants such as "mobilization decision-making and progressive involvement contribute a lot towards the notion that the union really embodies the will of the majority. As a result, decisions made is general assemblies, even though they might not be backed up by any law, are widely respected by students.

> The strike itself is perhaps the best example. In Quebec, student strikes have no legal basis whatsoever. Furthermore, enforcing the strike using picket lines and blockades of buildings is illegal. But unions' internal legitimacy is so strong that even while students know that the strike isn't explicitly lawful, picket lines are respected, even by students who oppose the strike.

> That's important, because it means student strikes are possible anywhere. It also means that we don't have to wait for the state or universities to recognize our unions, our general assemblies and our democratic decisions. Autonomous organization allows us to build a level of internal legitimacy so strong that it can override laws and other efforts of the elite to silence us.

3- CHRONICLE OF THE STRIKE

Lead-up

In 2010 and 2011, several months before the strike, student unions were very active. They were encouraged to hold general assemblies to discuss the tuition hike and to take a position. Even though it was clear from the beginning that nothing less than an unlimited general strike would have any chance of effectively blocking the hike, many protests and actions were organized as part of an escalation of tactics.

In December 6th 2010, students protested against a government "consultation" of education sector groups (students, labor unions, administrations, etc.) about the tuition hike which was obviously skewed in favor of the policy. There was an attempt to storm the conference floor but it didn't succeed.

In March 2011, the tuition hike was announced: it would come into effect in september 2012. Small, localized protests happened almost every day over a period of two weeks following the announcement. On the 20th, a meeting of the youth wing of the Liberal party (one of the groups pushing for the tuition hike) is disrupted. An occupation is organized with over 100 students in a finance ministry building on the 24th. The 31st, student unions stage a one-day strike with a 3000-strong protest and an occupation of the offices of the university administrator's lobby (also one of the groups pushing for the tuition hike).

Overall, the plan of action was simple: get people on board, launch a massive information campaign, stage a one-day general strike with a big demo and then put out a formal call-out for an unlimited general strike.

In 2010 and 2011, we focused on smaller-scale protests, training camps and other events with the objective of involving as many students as possible in their student union and in the committees formed around ASSE. By the end of 2011, not only were ASSE's commitees packed, but cores of activists had gathered around many student unions.

In September 2011, we launched a massive information campaign on campuses under the slogan "Stop the hike"5. All types of material was put out during that period: flyers, leaflets, posters, a website, video clips, research papers, etc. The goal was to get as much of this material into the hands of students and get them thinking and talking about the incoming hike of tuition fees.

A one-day general strike was planned for November 10th, with a big rally in Montreal. For weeks, the date was stressed as a vital step in the campaign and as a means of building pressure against the government. On many campuses, that strike vote was framed as an ultimatum: a negative response from the government after that day would

automatically trigger formal organizing efforts towards an unlimited general strike. In other words, even though talk of an unlimited general strike was was widespread among activists at that moment, the November rally was considered as a kind of stepping-stone.

With 200 000 students on strike that day and 30 000 marching in Montreal, November 10th was a resounding success. Never before had so many student unions simultaneously gone on such a 1-day strike. Expectations were blown away...

The rally also led to the very first media coverage of the student campaign to block the hike. Immediately, the government responded with its own pro-hike media campaign. A dedicated website along with radio ads promoted the hike as being essential to maintaining a quality education and hammered the lie that the hike, along with modest increases in student financial aid, wouldn't hurt accessibility. This government reaction generated lots of anger among students: a storm was brewing.

As the threat of a student strike began to materialize, several opportunist groups in the mainstream left lent official support to the student movement. Chief among them was the Parti

Québécois⁶, which declared its opposition to the tuition hike and promised to abolish it if elected. As the party foresaw a possible student strike on the horizon, it sought to score political points with this move, even though ideologically-speaking, the party wasn't opposed to tuition hikes in general, as its vote in favor of the first wave of tuition hikes in 2007 very clearly showed. Big labor federations also extended public support at this moment.

Strategic planning

During December 2011, we drew up plans for how we would start the unlimited general strike based on the experience of the 2005 strike. To ensure success, the launch of the strike was thought out as a succession of three "waves".

In the first wave, the most active and radical student unions would hold their strike general assemblies and votes before all other student unions. The motions put to a vote included a conditional component, whereas the strike would only become effective as soon as a total of seven student unions representing at least 20 000 students would adopt similar motions. Right on the heels of this first wave, a second wave consisting mainly of progressive and well-established

student unions would hold their own general assemblies. Lastly, weaker student unions with fewer activists or with unconvinced student bodies would try to join the strike in a third wave.

Starting the strike in such a progressive fashion provides some key advantages. First, it allows activists to focus their efforts on fewer student unions at a time. Since the hardest part of the strike is to get it going, this is a major advantage. Once the ball is rolling, energies can be focused on other



Rally in Montreal - Novembre 10th 2011. A few months before the strike.

unions which aren't on strike. Secondly, on campuses where the strike is effective, many students suddenly have much more free time which can be invested in mobilizing the student bodies of other campuses. And thirdly, a certain "mass effect" is created as soon as a critical number of student are on unlimited strike. As information starts trickling through media outlets as journalists turn their attention to student organizing and striking students discuss the issues with their friends, the strike can quickly snowball into a large and powerful movement.

In order to harness these benefits, the planning of the strike's launch calendar needed to be centralized. Unions who planned to join the strike would consult with the provincial executive in order to work out an appropriate date for a strike general assembly. As the beginning of any such strike is fragile, failed votes in the first days and weeks can undermine morale and hurt the chances of launching the strike. Consequently, the pressure is very high on the first few student unions who consult their membership on strike action.

At this point, we also drafted our strategy for the strike itself, based on past experiences. Here's how we thought it would play out, more or less:

The strike would begin in mid-February and grow in

⁶ The Parti Québécois is a centrist, mainstream political party most widely known for its position in favor of Quebec separatism.

numbers until mid-March

- Our goal was for 100 000 students to be on strike at that time;
- The government would maneuver to isolate CLASSE as a "radical faction" and negotiate with FECQ and FEUQ behind closed doors
- These negotiations would happen around mid-March;
- The FECQ and FEUQ would capitalize on a one-week strike strategy in March culminating with a big unitary student demonstration on the 22nd;
- After this show of force they would cut a flimsy deal with the government, near the first week of April as the academic semester started becoming threatened;
- Our goal was to shoot down this agreement in general assemblies and convince our fellow students to press on
- If the movement maintained its strength for one or two weeks after that, we thought the government would make bigger concessions to end the strike and avoid a disaster with semesters

In short, according to our best hopes, the strike would last between 6 to 9 weeks.

Launch

The weeks before the strike were incredibly hectic. As province-wide flying squads were organized, every available effort was put into mobilizing students in anticipation of the first strike votes. Often from 8 AM to 6 PM, activists were on campuses striking conversations with students on topic such as the upcoming vote, their union, general assemblies and related topics. Each conversation would typically take about 5 to 10 minutes and focus on addressing common misconceptions about the tuition hike and the strike itself.

As the first general assemblies took place, the overwhelmingly positive results quickly pushed us over the tipping point of 20 000 students with a strike mandate. By February 9th, most general assemblies in the first wave had voted in favor strike. One week sooner than anticipated, on Monday, February 13th, the unlimited general strike was launched.

Up until March 7th, the rhythm of the strike was rather typical: more and more student unions holding votes on the strike, strike committees getting organized on campuses, and students joining flying mobilization teams to go around the province and help spread the strike to other student unions.

On March 5th, we reached 125 000 students on strike, which was much faster than expected. But although the strike itself was growing substantially and one or two big rallies were happening every week, there were still very few direct actions aimed at disrupting business as usual. At the same

time, the leaders of FECQ and FEUQ were meeting the press and -- almost apologetically -- promising to put their striking students on voluntary community work...⁷

A turning point was reached on March 7th, when over a thousand students surrounded and blockaded the *Loto-Québec*⁸ building in downtown Montreal, and nearly two hundred stormed the ground floor and forced a shutdown. While the event was impressive in its number of participants, it remained entirely nonviolent: no windows broken, no rocks thrown around, etc. The mere presence of protesters was sufficient to significantly disrupt the routine of this government institution.



« Things are hotting up »

, deux visions. Mais qui a ra

Les étudiants ou le gouvernement? PAG

For the striking students occupying the building and protesting outside, the action was entirely legitimate and warranted by the goal to block the tuition hike. When people were asked to leave, no one moved... until riot police started moving in on students with batons blazing. During this brutal attempt to disperse the crowd and clear out the building, pepper spray was used profusely and flashbang grenades were thrown into the lot, severely injuring one student and causing him to lose an eye.

As a first encounter with riot police and the violence of the state, the episode was rich in lessons for the students participating, the vast majority obviously having had little previous experience in facing all-out repression.

http://www.pieuvre.ca/2012/03/05/greve-benevolat/

⁸ Loto-Québec is the state-owned lottery corporation in Quebec.

Encountering the police force's insults, abuse and brutality opened the eyes of many who held the belief that officers always acted reasonably and in good faith. Not only did the event strengthen our resolve to continue the struggle, but students were now much more distrustful of police and willing to consider self-defence tactics during demonstrations and direct actions. Furthermore, the next day, public statements by several business leaders and city officials pressing the government to sit down and negotiate with students gave credibility to the argument that direct action gets the goods.

Direct action

At this point, it's important to clarify the concept of « direct action » in the context of the strike.

In essence, direct action is about students themselves being the main actors of their struggle, as opposed to representatives. As such, it's the counterpart to the direct democracy of student unions. Direct action is also about refusing mediation of the conflict by groups or individuals who often empower themselves at the expense of those on whose behalf they claim to speak, forcing them, explicitly or not, into roles of mere spectators. The « acceptable » political channels such as mass media and closed-door dialogue, which, under the guise of « solution-building », are always primarily aimed at the pacification of conflicts are thus incompatible with direct action. The aim is to build the struggle outside, and often in opposition to, the political process.

Although direct action is never bounded by the limits of legality, we must reject the notion that direct action necessarily involves property destruction or violence against individuals. Those who insist on this aspect misunderstand the philosophy of direct action; the idea isn't to replace politicians with a radical fringe. On the contrary, direct actions must strive to be, as much as possible, mass actions. Within the student movement, this can only arise when those with the initiative of direct actions are in relationship with general assemblies and take cues from them about the appropriate tactics to deploy.

While the strike owed much to CLASSE as a formal, centralised organization, the movement's strength, its ability to disrupt business as usual, also derived from autonomy and decentralisation, without which direct action can't exist. Individuals or groups could lead initiatives outside the union structures without systematically being labelled as nefarious splinter groups. As long as they were not isolated from student assemblies, and discussion about strategy and tactics was encouraged, they could empower each other instead of viewing one another with constant suspicion.

On the ground, CLASSE itself mostly organized large rallies and demonstrations while direct actions such as blockades and occupations were often undertaken by affinity groups close to local student unions. Would-be participants could consult an open calendar on CLASSE's website where most of the upcoming actions were recorded. These were divided into three categories based on which type of group was behind each action: CLASSE, local student unions or individuals.

The nature of autonomous actions varied quite a bit and while their timings, targets or means weren't always strategic, CLASSE's role was not to police nor condemn them. This was most important as spokespersons interviewed by the media were often invited – and sometimes pressed – to condemn « violent » or « unacceptable » actions by students such as blocking roads. Internally, they were expected maintain a distance by stating that a particular action wasn't organized by CLASSE, but otherwise, to put it in context and justify its legitimacy.

Of course, an important consequence of encouraging direct action is the repression that often follows. The movement dealt with this in a variety of ways. To better prepare students, workshops on safety in demonstrations, legal defence and security culture were organised on campuses. To deal with arrests and charges, a legal committee comprised of fully accredited lawyers and helpers (mostly law students) was put together and available on-call 24/7. And to ensure the long-term legal defence of the accused, efforts were put into building a fund through fundraising events and solicitation of labor unions and other groups. All these resources were made available by CLASSE to anyone who participated in any action in support of the strike, regardless of their status as a student or affiliation to any particular student union.⁹

Expansion

After March 7th, direct actions became more frequent and yet despite widespread condemnation of the violent tactics which resulted in a young man losing an eye, the police response was increasingly vicious. Confrontations became more common.

Then came March 15th, the International day against police brutality. For the last ten years or so, a few hundred would take to the streets in Montreal annually on that date to highlight the problem of police brutality. That year, this demonstration was much bigger than ever before. As expected, the march was only tolerated for a very short time until riot squads moved in and attacked the crowd. Scenes

⁹ In contrast, FECQ and FEUQ offered legal support through a contracted law firm, but only to its **O**wn members.

attempted to chase down groups of protesters who refused to disperse and, in some cases, vandalised police cruisers which occupied almost every street corner.

of chaos across downtown were witnessed as the squads surprise, we learned early on that some of these students had links with the Liberal party.

As the big student rally planned for March 22nd approached, the government's response to the strike was more defiant than we had expected. For weeks it consistently rejected growing calls for negotiation with student groups, while at the same time reiterating ad nauseam its justifications for the tuition hike.

On the other hand, the momentum for the strike vastly surpassed our expectations, By mid-March, more than 200 000 student were on strike, much higher than we hoped to reach during the entire length of the campaign. We realised then, almost in disbelief, that we were on track to shatter the record of the largest student strike in the history of the province.

Over 300 000 students were on strike on March 22nd, which is about 75% of all Cegep and university students in Quebec. Buses converged from all corners of the province into Montreal for the rally which was in the making for months. It's estimated that 200 000 people participated, easily making it the bigger protest ever seen in the province.

This huge protest and the sheer number of students on strike, combined with the fact that more and more students were drawn into organising and participating in direct actions, made us recognize that we had more leverage than ever over the government.

Still, faced with an unequivocal adversary, we still had to keep building up the pressure. After the protest on the 22nd and lots of discussion in general assemblies, CLASSE called on students to organise a "week of economic disruption". Autonomous student groups massively answered the call, and for the following weeks, up to three major direct actions were happening every day. Ministry buildings, office towers, government institutions, highways and even the Port of Montreal became the targets of blockades and actions of disruption. As autonomous initiatives multiplied, some buildings like the Ministry of Education in Montreal were even targeted repeatedly.

Injunctions

At the beginning of April, with the strike going strong for a seventh week, a right-wing minority opposing the strike started organizing and making itself heard. Without much

200 000 FOIS «ENTENDEZ-NO

Emporté par la foule | Une marée humaine. Parents, professeurs et étudiants participent à l'une des plus importantes manifestations qu'a connues Montréal

Because they knew they couldn't convince general assemblies to end the strike, they turned to the courts to obtain injunctions allowing them to resume their classes. Though CLASSE fought them on legal grounds, judges granted them one after the other, mainly on the grounds that a student strike had no legal basis and that the continued picketing of campuses would bring these students immediate and irreparable harm. Since these injunctions were only granted on an individual basis, it took a lot of time, money and effort for opponents of the strike to obtain them. Nonetheless, a month later, over 100 injunctions were in effect across the province.

The first injunction had a shockwave effect across the movement. To all intents and purposes, it meant that a minority of (mainly wealthy, well-connected) students could get a court order to circumvent the student union's democratic decision-making, effectively transposing an eminently political issue into a legal one. Obviously, this angered a huge number of students, including those who were opposed to the strike but considered the general

legitimacy was so strong that it easily superseded the legitimacy of the justice system which had revealed its conservative and reactionary nature.

Despite the threat of arrest and imprisonment¹⁰, the injunctions were massively challenged on all campuses where they came into effect. In the case of the very first individual who had obtained one, students formed a huge "corridor of shame" leading to the anthropology class where the teacher waited to give an open-door lecture on "conflict management"! Other campuses were picketed by large groups of masked students prepared to face security guards and police and in yet other instances, classes resumed by such court orders were disrupted by groups of students.

Administrations responded by appealing for calm and pleading for the injunctions to be respected. Yet in most places, when faced with students determined to enforce their strike, they backed down. There was no way classes could resume in normal conditions short of triggering big

confrontations on their campuses and having dozens, even hundreds of their own students arrested. Teachers, who were numerous to support the strike, were also scandalised by the injunctions and resisted demands to resume classes.

Unfortunately, some administrations did decide to test the students' resistance by ordering security guards and/or law enforcement to clear out picket lines. Where these attempts weren't quickly abandoned, situations degenerated in allout confrontation. In a cegep north of Montreal, provincial police fired tear gas on campus to clear out picket lines which included parents and teachers. At Université de Montréal, when

students learned that administrators were ordering faculty to lecture empty classes, a huge protest of nearly a thousand students rampaged on campus towards the administration building, sabotaging classroom furniture on their way. After a serious attempt to force the principal's office door using a battering ram, they too backed down.

Negociations

injunctions were spreading, prompting movement's rank-and-file to become increasingly restless, the government was steadfast in its rejection of any form of compromise or negotiation. By mid-April, the total number of students on strike was stabilizing, but in many general assemblies, the voting numbers gap between for and against the strike was shrinking. We feared that if a few

assemblies' decisions legitimate. The movement's internal major student unions stopped the strike, it could trigger a trend that would collapse the strike. In all likeliness, this is what the government was hoping for.

> However, at the same time, the movement was radicalizing itself. Several factors were at play, notably the absence of any dialogue on the part of authorities for such a long time after the beginning of the strike. The government was at pains to maintain its image of being "of the people and for the people" rather than "of the rich and for their businesses".

> Actions in the streets grew more brazen and defiance of police and riot squads was increasingly widespread. In parallel, assemblies took bold steps to signify their intention to persevere by deciding to suspend their regular continuation votes and commit to only reconsider the strike if and when the government made an offer. This trend of "eternal strikes", as they became known, started in a single cegep known for its radical politics but quickly spread across the strike movement. Within a few weeks, over 100 000 students were on this type of strike.



Students resisting the injunction at Université de Montréal

Finally, on April 15, the education minister announced it was ready to engage in talks with the students union leaders, but at one condition: that they all publicly condemn violence. FECQ and FEUQ obliged all too happily, yet CLASSE, invoking the need to first consult its general assemblies, didn't follow suit. As such, the government hoped to isolate CLASSE under the pretext that it could never negotiate with apologists of violence and thus hold negotiations with only the moderate federations at the bargaining table.

This plan was frustrated when FEUQ announced its refusal to participate in any negotiations from which CLASSE would be excluded. This unprecedented show of basic solidarity from an organisation most previously known for its contempt of ASSÉ could be explained by two main reasons. First, because at this point the strike movement was in very large part identified to CLASSE, through the mainstream media as

¹⁰ Failure to comply or obstruction of an injunction is punishable by up to two years in jail.

wanted to avoid making such a strongly divisive move that Predictably, in the following days, the offer was massively would have outraged masses of already angry students. rejected by general assemblies.

Second, because it was going through an internal crisis where member unions threatened to defederate if FEUQ accepted negotiation without CLASSE. Many within the federation were keen to avoid a scenario similar to the one that played out during the 2005 general student strike.

Within CLASSE, the issue of violence was referred to general assemblies and the congress. The next week, the congress adopted a resolution condemning the "deliberation violence against individuals unless in legitimate defense". Student unions refused to condemn radical tactics and direct actions such as blockades and occupations, which is what the government was seeking by using the blanket word of violence. Obviously, the right-wing accused

CLASSE of wordplay, and insisted that an organisation condoning vandalism and destruction should be dealt with through law enforcement and not politics. In the end however, the move was largely perceived as an act of good faith and the education minister reluctantly agreed to convene all three student groups to negotiations.

First meetings between the two parties were held on April 23 and 24. While FECQ and FEUQ were represented by each federation's president, CLASSE sent the members of its negotiations committee elected explicitly to this function. Ostensibly, the government's strategy was undermined by the presence of CLASSE delegates. In typical negotiation scenarios such as with unions for example, representatives are free to put forward alternative proposals and strike agreements that fall short of the demands or goals of the movement. Most often, this mediation role played by the movement's leadership can make conflicts shorter, but at the expense of helping to push through scant offers against the membership's will. The CLASSE negotiations committee had no such mandate, however. It could neither propose a compromise to the government nor recommend any offer to students: its function was strictly limited to communicating the demands of general assemblies and report back with the government's offers.

Shortly after breaking off negotiations, the government made a public offer through a media statement. To say it fell short of reversing the tuition hike is an understatement. The offer was so pathetic that the very same evening, a spontaneous night demonstration of several thousand marched against it, chanting "it's not an offer, it's an insult,

well as its grassroots mobilising efforts on campuses. FEUQ our answer: demonstrations every night until victory!"



« The Maple Spring » and «The savage State»

The Maple Spring

As politicians and media pundits emphasised an imagined dichotomy between "honest taxpayers" and "egoist students", the movement sought to express solidarity with struggles outside the scope of the education system. Through its public appearances, CLASSE began to more explicitly frame the conflict as part of a broader struggle against neoliberalism. The slogan "The students are on strike, but the people is in struggle" was used on banners and publications and the expression "Maple Spring", a play on words tying our struggle to the "Arab Spring", came into use. Although several attempts were made to break the limits of the student strike and generalize the struggle, for example by organizing joint demonstrations with workers on strike, this proved very difficult.

The unfolding of two events, which occurred at the end of April seemed to reveal some success, however. The first was a government convention to promote Plan Nord, a plan to exploit natural resources in northern Quebec, and the second was the Earth Day rally. While unconnected to the student strike, the context in which they took place produced unexpected effects.

On April 20th, CLASSE organized a demonstration to disrupt the Plan Nord convention in Montreal. Though the government plan was heavily criticized by ecologist and native groups, CLASSE's primary intent wasn't an ecological one. Rather, it was an opportunity for action, like many others before it, aimed at disrupting business as usual and

putting more pressure on the government. After entering the convention building, a few dozen demonstrators were confronted by riot police guarding the entrance to the hall and were violently evicted. As they rejoined other demonstrators outside, comprised mainly of students, worker's unions, native groups, police attacked the crowd with tear gas. For the next few hours, police and protesters battled it out on the usually dull downtown streets. The prime minister was embarrassed and the protests raised awareness about *Plan Nord*, which suddenly became a controversial issue for students. In a way, CLASSE became ecologist by association.

Two days later, on April 22nd, an Earth Day march took place, also in Montreal. It's estimated that over 200 000 thousand people took part, and judging from the chants and placards, a huge number of students also participated. Several previously isolated issues like the environment, native rights and the right to education seemed to converge and all become part of the movement.

In many ways, the 2012 student strike was breaking new ground. All the government's attempts to contain or break the strike proved ineffective: settlement offers, playing student unions against one another, injunctions, heavy-handed policing, etc. As massive nightly demonstrations happening on a daily basis gathered thousands, tens of thousands even, police were unable to keep order on the streets. The usual dispersal tactics were incapable of ending these rowdy protests, as people kept on regrouping even as riot squads charged the dense crowds. Provincial police in riot gear and surveillance helicopters were brought in

putting more pressure on the government. After entering and became a common sight in Montreal for days. The the convention building, a few dozen demonstrators were government appeared to be in total loss of control in the confronted by riot police guarding the entrance to the face of the movement.

The Battle of Victoriaville

The climate of social crisis reached a climax on May 4th. A coalition of community groups, ecologists and labor unions bussed in protesters from across the province to Victoriaville, an small, quiet town east of Montreal, where the ruling Liberal party was holding its annual convention. Upon reaching the hotel hosting the convention, the crowd of about 3000-strong quickly overwhelmed the small barriers intended to keep everyone clear of the hotel grounds. As people approached the windows and entrances, tensions flared and riot police moved in to push the protest back using massive amounts of tear gas and plastic bullets. This continued hours-long on the premises surround the hotel, with a number of protesters attempting to slow down the advance of polices lines by throwing back rocks and tear gas canisters. Students and their allies suffered some of the worst injuries of the entire student strike during this confrontation, mainly owing to the provincial police's extensive and dangerous use of plastic bullets, also known as "plastic baton rounds". Several buses on the return trip were also intercepted by law enforcement and searched.

Although the news of chaos and confrontation were not welcomed in the media or the general public, the government was widely regarded as the party responsible for these events. The prime minister appeared inept to deal with the conflict.



Painting depicting the Battle of Victoriaville

The next day, a new round of negotiations were announced. This time, labor leaders were brought in to "facilitate" the discussions between the government and student negotiators and act as mediators. Meetings went on uninterrupted for nearly 24 hours, leaving little time for students to rest and the CLASSE negotiations committee to confer. Labor leaders, for their part, with their paternalistic attitude towards students and their urging them to get along and sign an agreement, did not show themselves to be allies of the movement.

Finally, a tentative agreement was signed. Irrespective of the settlement terms it offered, it proved highly controversial among CLASSE CLASSE calcivists: the document contained provisions that the negotiations committee had no authority to accept, such as a commitment not to organize any demonstration linked to the agreement. In the negotiation committee's report, the role of labor leaders, the dynamics of the meetings and exhaustion were cited as reasons for the error and an apology was made.

Nonetheless, the government, confident the exercise would signal the end of the strike, declared the conflict over.

Towards bill 78

But it was badly mistaken. The agreement offered no compromise on tuition fees and instead, commissioned the creation of a review-board of sorts which would seek to uncover funds in university budgets which eventually could, possibly, be used to partially offset the tuition fee hike. General assemblies, after reviewing the content of the proposal along with the flawed process that produced it, unanimously rejected it. The government was, in a way, stuck between a rock and a hard place.

The strike showed some signs of wavering, but still over 150 000 students were on strike and seemed determined to do what it takes and go to the end. The mood in assemblies was resolved: the only acceptable proposal was to scrap the tuition hike. After so many weeks of protesting and enduring repression, the stakes were higher than ever.

On the other hand, the government didn't appear to be giving up either. It still had support among the public, so by conceding or compromising it risked losing a huge amount of credibility. If we take into account the global context, with France, England, Greece, Chile as examples, in the past years and months uprisings there gradually faded without making any significant headway, while governments held



CLASSE calling for acts of civil disobedience against bill 78 in press conference

their ground. It's likely that Quebec didn't want to set a precedent.

As special legislation designed to break the strike was rumored to be in the works, the education minister resigned, probably because she opposed it. But the resignation of the minister who had been the face of the state's intransigence was a bittersweet victory. A few days later, the Liberal Party introduced bill 78 in parliament. The emergency law, officially titled "An Act to enable students to receive instruction from the postsecondary institutions they attend", was adopted in haste after an hours-long marathon session.

The law immediately suspended the semester of every institution on strike, postponing the remaining classes until August. It introduced heavy fines for any individual, union or organization enforcing a student strike from that moment forward. It also restricted protests across the province by declaring illegal any gathering of 50 persons or more unless the event's date, time, itinerary and other details are preapproved by police. Anyone advocating or urging defiance of this law could also be subject to stiff penalties.

May 22nd and the « casseroles »

The law's severity came as a big shock for striking students and supporters of the strike. Few of us had predicted such harsh, unprecedented measures. It even prompted a number of groups outside the movement such as the Quebec Human Rights Commission and the Bar of Quebec to condemn the legislation on the grounds that it violated fundamental charter rights.

But like other attempts to beat the movement into submission, the law failed to break the momentum of the strike. The night of law's the adoption, a huge riot broke out in downtown Montreal, with several improvised barricades set on fire. Subsequent nightly demonstrations saw renewed fierceness and vitality. Instead, it caused anti-government outrage to spill over, of which the May 22nd rally was a testament.

In a press conference two days before the rally, CLASSE publicly announced that it wouldn't provide the itinerary of the march to police¹¹ in overt defiance of the emergency law and calling for acts of civil disobedience against it. While FECQ and FEUQ promised to challenge the law in the courts, the CLASSE student delegates, meeting in a congress just days before, agreed to face it head-on, in the streets, even if it brought with it the possibility of arrests of its officials or crippling fines. The entire organisation was put on the line: if the government wants to destroy CLASSE, better to go down in flames than submit.

The May 22nd rally, in which about 200 000 to 250 000 took part, was labelled the largest act of civil disobedience in the history of Quebec. Although it was illegal in regards to the emergency law, the Montreal police spokesperson declared that the march would be tolerated as long as no criminal acts or misdemeanors were committed. Aside from a smaller break-away group that targeted a few banks and storefronts along their own route, the main demonstration remained entirely nonviolent.

The event also highlighted the obsessively lawabiding strategies of the leaderships of the FECQ, FEUQ and labor unions. While the context cried out for action against the new emergency law, they all concerted separately from CLASSE

to provide a route to police in advance (as they always did before, anyway) and led their own groups away from the "illegal" main protest. With only a few hundred following in the footsteps of these usually well-organized and disciplined processions, the initiative was an obvious failure. The events of the following days would demonstrate: masses of people were ready and willing to defy the emergency law on the streets.

This, of course, was a most exciting development. Up until then, the state, with its vast security apparatus, had again proven its ability to endure bunches of activists symbolically attacking property and confronting riot police. But against vast numbers of people refusing to acknowledge the law-making authority of the state, and prepared to take action, albeit peacefully, its options were likely more limited. In our view, the government was pushed into an even trickier situation, with seemingly shifting odds.

Its problem of legitimacy worsened in the following days and weeks with what became known as the "casserole movement". The original idea, launched as a call-out on social media, was for people to bang pots and pans on their front door every day at 8PM, for twenty minutes, as a sign of opposition to bill 78. Early on, people began occupying sidewalks, parks and street corners with these very loud and noisy casserole rallies, eventually turning into improvised and illegal marches on neighborhood streets. On every street, upon hearing the rally passing in front, residents would come out and bang their pots and pans in concert with the protesters. These marches became so prevalent across the city that the mayor publicly asked for people not to take part in them, and instead stay in their homes to bang pots and pans. Of course, the demand went unheeded.



May 22nd rally

It was hard to predict the police's reaction to these protest, but it soon became clear that it wouldn't enforce the protest-restricting aspect of bill 78: not only would this mean arresting thousands of people in many different points in the city, with all that would entail, but aside from the police's great difficulty in directing and routing these marches, they were most peaceful and not big a threat to public order.

In Montreal, these small and numerous neighborhood protests often continued late into the evening. They would merge together and eventually converge into nightly 9PM rally in the downtown area, forming a single gigantic and often deafening demonstration. While the movement was centered in Montreal, suburbs and small towns also saw their own pots and pans rallies, with several similar events also appearing in cities across Canada and the US.

This period also marked the birth of several autonomous

neighborhood assemblies in Montreal, which aimed to consolidate the struggle outside of campuses by tapping into the enthusiasm of the pots and pans movement and the community it created among residents. Although there was little coordination between the neighborhood assemblies themselves, many set out to work on related matters such as mobilising in favor of a "social strike", providing support for the arrestees of the strike and organising popular education and teach-ins.

Summer

Meanwhile, the official suspension of the semester in the 14 cegeps and departments of 11 universities still on strike imposed a lull in the struggle. In a sense, the government was locking-out student unions from campuses for the summer, in order to "ease off tensions", as officials put it. Having no strike renewal votes to organise, most local unions stopped organising general assemblies, while those which maintained them saw numbers of student participation plummet.

Long months of constant struggle and repression also began to bear heavily. With the advent of the summer months, large portions of students turned their attention to holidays or temp work. The severe requirements of modern life, which, for many of us, means having to work during the holiday season to pay for food and housing, soon caught up. Networks of relief and mutual aid, which could perhaps have helped maintain the strike community, were for the most part nonexistent until the after the strike was over.

Nevertheless, many students still considered themselves as being on strike and took part in various protests during the summer. Notably, efforts to disrupt events surrounding the Formula-1 racing event in Montreal, while spearheaded by anti-capitalist groups, became linked with the student struggle as one local student union's assembly decided to organise protests aimed at cancelling the race altogether. With security reinforced and repression hitting hard on the weekend's rallies, these efforts were largely unsuccessful.

As the weeks passed by, while the pots and pans protests had nearly completely faded away, rumors of elections grew.

Elections

On August 1st, the ruling Liberal party dissolved the government and launched an early election campaign, barely two weeks before the semesters starting up again for striking students. Betting that the strike was over and that students would choose to return to class, the party hoped to win back some support by arguing bill 78's effectiveness at bringing back peace and order on campuses. The Parti

Quebecois, on the other hand, which led the polls from the first day of the campaign, promised to abolish the tuition hike and bill 78. Many students interpreted this as victory being close at hand.

FECQ and FEUQ launched campaigns to boost youth participation in the elections and work against the Liberal party's campaign. For them, the strike was already over. FECQ's former-president-turned-PQ-candidate called for an "electoral truce" -- a call echoed by many in the Left -- in which student unions would suspend the strike to give the new government a chance. Furthermore, FECQ's new president told media that continuing the strike would be "academically disastrous" for students.

CLASSE, in its case, mostly stayed away from playing a part in electoral politics, sticking to a slogan broadly condemning neoliberalism, ambiguously calling for voting against the three main more-or-less right-wing parties. Instead, it hammered the message that the strike was not over and the assemblies were the ones deciding if the strike was over or not. Among the student group and activists in local unions, opinions were divided on the option of continuing the



«Our dreams are bigger than ballot boxes.»

no sense (the government being dissolved) and that if the PQ wasn't elected or if it reneged on its promises, the strike could be revived after elections.

In the week of August 13th, virtually all local student unions voted down the strike by large majorities. Despite passionate defenses of the strike and little anti-strike arguments at the assemblies themselves, the strike collapsed.

Arguably, most students didn't realize what more could be gained by continuing the strike that the PQ's probable election victory couldn't bring. They weren't ready to risk

strike. Some thought that striking during an election made what was left of their semester, just in case the PQ didn't win at the polls.

> The PQ went on to win, by a small margin, the elections held on September 4th. It ensured this outcome by federating the Left and nationalist votes on a platform which included, apart from the promise aimed at ending the student conflict, increasing taxes of the the richest, abolishing a regressive health tax and several environment-friendly policies. On September 19th, a decree officially abolished the tuition hike.

4- CONCLUSION

The 2012 Quebec student strike has demonstrated yet other of of its progressive proposals. It has implemented an again the potential and power of democratic and combative movements. Movements that seek inspiration from the strike need to start thinking about moving towards direct democracy and focus not just on building appropriate formal structures, but also on fostering a culture of horizontalism. Just as importantly, they must do away with any illusions they might still have about dialogue and collaboration with state institutions. Any leverage students had against the government, they got by disrupting business as usual through direct action.

Above all, the strike could not have seen the day without the sustained engagement and dedication of students who have continued to organise even through defeat and deception. Movement-building is a task that needs to be conceived over the long term, with failures anticipated along the way.

We must also warn the reader who might be tempted to think, after reading this, that CLASSE was the perfect embodiment of the ideals and principles we have sought to highlight: it was not. Whatever the perspective, CLASSE was not the holy beacon of democracy and radicalism that it was made out to be in some quarters.

In this sense, we might be accused of glossing over the contradictions of the movement. But the aim here was to provide a toolkit, not write a full, thorough assessment of the strike. We hope, nonetheless, to be able to improve it in the future with extra material and debates.

It is perhaps fitting, then, to end this endeavour by touching on such a debate. The outcome of the strike seems to have comforted some in their view that a parliamentary party should be part of any strategy aimed at profound, widespread social change. Yet, since being elected and abolishing the tuition hike, the PQ has reneged on many austerity budget complete with cuts in the education sector, winning even the admiration of the previous government and its business allies. And with the PQ's Summit on higher education around the corner, the new government seems poised to introduce a softer hike on tuition fees along with legislation that will frame future student strikes.

Our stance is that any electable political party, once in power, would follow the elite's political program, regardless of the radical origins of its own program. The PQ is showing once again that election campaign promises are far too often the victims of government "realism" and "pragmatism", and that left-leaning or leftist parties cannot be trusted with the outcomes of our struggles.

Instead, we propose that we should rely on nothing but ourselves, building our own capacities to resist austerity and institutionalise change through self-organisation.